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Abstract
This paper develops a model of financial institutions that borrow short-
term and invest into long-term marketable assets. Because these financial
intermediaries perform maturity transformation, they are subject to runs.
We endogenize the profits of the intermediary and derive distinct liquidity
and solvency conditions that determine whether a run can be prevented.
We first characterize these conditions for an isolated intermediary and then
generalize them to the case where the intermediary can sell assets to prevent
runs. The sale of assets can eliminate runs if the intermediary is solvent but
illiquid. However, because of cash-in-the-market pricing, this becomes less
likely the more intermediaries are facing problems. In the limit, in case of a
general market run, no intermediary can sell assets to forestall a run, and our
original solvency and liquidity constraints are again relevant for the stability
of financial institutions.
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1 Introduction
This paper develops a model of financial institutions funded by short-term
borrowing and holding marketable assets. We show that such institutions are
subject to the threat of runs similar to those faced by commercial banks and
study the conditions under which runs can occur. We argue that profits are
a key stabilizing element against runs, endogenize the profits, and derive dis-
tinct solvency and liquidity conditions for such institutions. Both conditions
must hold for runs to be avoided. We also ask whether the sale of marketable
assets can help prevent runs. If an institution is solvent, but illiquid, asset
sales may help. However, as more institutions try to sell assets, their prices
decline, limiting the amount that can be raised. In the limit, asset sales are
completely ineffective. Indeed, if all borrowers try to sell assets, no institu-
tion is in a position to purchase them and the borrowers find themselves in
the same situation as if their assets were not marketable.
Our framework is general and could be used to study several types of
financial institutions that use short-term borrowing as a main source of fi-
nancing. Such institutions include money market mutual funds, hedge funds,
off-balance sheet vehicles including asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP)
conduits, and structured investment vehicles (SIVs). We apply our model to
large securities dealers who use the tri-party repo market as a main source
of financing. This market is particularly interesting because of the key role
it played during the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-09. It played a role in the
collapse of Bear Stearns, which was triggered by a run of its creditors and cus-
tomers, analogous to the run of depositors on a commercial bank.2 This run
was surprising, however, in that Bear Stearns’s borrowing was largely secured
– that is, its lenders held collateral to ensure repayment even if the company
itself failed. However, given the illiquidity of markets in mid-March, credi-
tors may have lost confidence that they could recoup their loans by selling
the collateral. Many short-term lenders declined to renew their loans, driv-
ing Bear to the brink of default (Bernanke 2008). More generally, as noted
by the Task Force on Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure (2009), “Tri-party repo
2See Duffie (2010) for more details on the dynamics that can lead to the failure of a
dealer bank.
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arrangements were at the center of the liquidity pressures faced by securities
firms at the height of the financial crisis”. The creation of the primary dealer
credit facility (PDCF) provided a backstop for the tri-party repo market.
We develop a framework to study the fragility of dealers who hold mar-
ketable securities funded by short-term collateralized liabilities, building on
the theory of commercial bank instability developed by Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), Qi (1994), and others. In our view, there are important similarities
between the fragility of commercial banking and securities trading. Our main
goal is to exhibit and model these similarities, and to highlight the funda-
mental differences between securities dealers that borrow in the repo market
against marketable securities as collateral and commercial banks that borrow
unsecured deposits and hold nonmarketable loan portfolios.
A key contribution of our paper is to endogenize profits of dealers and
show how profits are important to reduce financial fragility. Dealers have
the choice between funding securities with their own cash or with short-term
debt. We derive a dynamic participation constraint under which dealers
will prefer to fund their operations with short-term debt and show that this
condition implies that dealers make positive profits in equilibrium. These
profits can be used to forestall a run and thus serve as a systemic buffer. If
current profits are insufficient to forestall a run, dealers can boost current
cash flows at the expense of future profits by distorting their investment
strategy. We derive two constraints that can be interpreted as “solvency”
and “liquidity” constraints and that are sufficient to prevent a run. The
solvency constraint holds if the sum of current and future profits that can
be mobilized through reductions in investment is sufficiently high to repay
all investors. Even if the solvency constraint holds, however, the dealer must
be able to have access to enough funds at the time of the run to prevent it.
This occurs only if the liquidity constraint holds. Runs cannot occur if both
constraints are satisfied.
While traditional banks hold opaque assets that are difficult to liquidate
to meet withdrawals, securities dealers hold marketable assets that can po-
tentially be sold to generate cash. We show that the ability to sell assets can
help a dealer forestall a run if it is solvent but illiquid. How much asset sales
can help, however, depends on various factors, including the market price of
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assets, that we identify in Section 6. Healthy dealers are willing to pay for
assets up to the opportunity cost of their funds. As more assets are sold, the
price of assets declines, and it becomes more difficult for a distressed dealer
to raise cash. If several dealers simultaneously are in distress and attempt
to sell their assets at the same time, cash-in-the market pricing (Allen and
Gale 1994, Acharya and Yorulmazer 2008) limits this option further. In the
limit, in the case of a market-wide run, no dealer is available to buy assets,
and our liquidity and solvency conditions are necessary and sufficient to rule
out market-wide runs.
Our theory is based on a dynamic rational expectations model with multi-
ple equilibria. However, unlike in conventional models of multiple equilibria,
not “everything goes” in our model. The theory pins down under what con-
ditions individual institutions are subject to potential self-fulfilling runs, and
when they are immune to such expectations. Since the intermediaries in
our model are heterogenous and the liquidity and solvency conditions are
specific to each institution, the theory makes predictions about individual
institutions, and equilibrium is consistent with observations of some institu-
tions failing and others surviving in case of changing market expectations.
An important economic function of the tri-party repo market, and of repo
markets more generally, is to perform maturity transformation. An overnight
repo is a short-term liability that is backed by a long-term asset, in the form
of a security. Tri-party investors lend overnight repo and have access to their
funds every morning, even if the securities that back the repos are not liquid.
In “normal” times, maturity transformation is possible because there is a
large number of tri-party lenders with largely independent needs for cash.
On a given day, an individual lender may decide to “withdraw” its funds
from the tri-party repo market by not rolling over the overnight loan. But in
the aggregate, the amount of cash available in tri-party repos in our model
will be stable by the law of large numbers. This is what happened in the
market until 2007.
The maturity transformation provided by tri-party repo contracts resem-
bles, in many ways, the maturity transformation achieved by commercial
banks. Banks offer demand deposit contracts that allow the depositors to
obtain their funds whenever they want. Yet, banks typically hold long-term
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assets. The decision of a depositor not to withdraw her funds from the bank
is similar to the decision of a repo lender to reinvest. The bank can provide
a demand deposit contract because it knows that depositors are unlikely to
all withdraw their funds at the same time, but it is nevertheless vulnerable
to coordination failures. We show that the same vulnerability can arise in
other arrangements performing maturity transformation. In fact, the kind of
strategic complementarities that can lead to runs in our model have also been
found empirically in other types of intermediaries, notably mutual funds (see
Chen, Goldstein, Jiang, 2010).
Conceptually, our theory of banking differs from that of Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) in one important aspect. In Diamond and Dybvig (1983),
deposit contracts are collective insurance devices for risk-averse households.
In our framework, dealers interact with financial investors such as pension
funds, money market funds and other institutions, for whom risk-aversion is
probably not the right, and certainly not a robust assumption. We therefore
do not place restrictions on investor preferences except for monotonicity. The
raison d’être of banking in our model are fixed costs as in Diamond (1984).
The creation, management, and marketing of securities is a specialized activ-
ity that requires the payment of fixed costs. Delegating these activities to a
dealer is more efficient than having them performed by many small investors
separately. Since this theory of delegation is standard, we do not develop
it in this paper, and simply assume that the technology is only operated by
dealers.
Our paper is complementary to Gorton and Metrick (2009), who point
out the similarity between traditional bank runs and repo market instability.
In particular, they argue that Repo rates, collateral, and other features of
“securitized banking”, as they call it, have counterparts in commercial bank-
ing. However, Gorton and Metrick (2009) do not propose a formal model
of securitized banking and thus cannot identify the determinants of profits,
liquidity, and solvency that are at the core of our analysis.3 They docu-
ment a large increase in haircuts for some repo transactions and argue that
3Shleifer and Vishny’s “Unstable Banking” (2009) formalizes some elements of securi-
tized banking, but focusses mostly on the spillover of irrational investor sentiments into
the securitized loan market.
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the rise in margins is akin to a run on the repo market. Their data does
not include the tri-party repo market. Available data for the tri-party repo
market, however, suggests that margins in the tri-party repo market did not
increase much during the crisis, if at all. It appears that some tri-party repo
investors prefer to stop financing a dealer rather than increase margins to
protect themselves (see Task Force on Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure 2009).
This is consistent with our model of expectations-driven runs and in contrast
to the type of margin spirals described in Brunnermeier and Pederson (2009).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: The next section provides
an overview of the tri-party repo market. Section 3 describes our model.
Section 4 characterizes steady states without runs. In particular, we derive
the dealer’s dynamic participation constraint in this section. Section 5 and
6 study the case of runs without and with asset sales, respectively. Section
7 discusses an extension of the model. Section 8 concludes.
2 An overview of the tri-party repo market
This sections provide an overview of the tri-party repo market, which is a
lead example of our theory. We also describe below how our model could
apply to other institutions such as money market mutual funds.
A repurchase agreement, or repo, is a sale of securities coupled with an
agreement to repurchase the securities at a specified price on a later date
(Garbade 2006). It resembles a collateralized loan, where the proceeds of the
initial sale can be associated with the principal amount of the loan and the
excess of the repurchase price over the sale price corresponds to the interest
paid on the loan.
Tri-party repos are a popular form of repo contracts. As its name indi-
cates, there are three parties to such a contract: the lender, the borrower,
and a clearing bank. The lender is willing to lend cash against collateral.
The borrower needs to obtain cash to fund its securities, which can be used
as collateral. The clearing bank provides a variety of administrative services
to support the transactions, including custody of securities, movement of
cash and securities and valuation of collateral as well as optimization tools
to support efficient collateral allocation. Because it deals with a large num-
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ber of borrowers and lenders, the clearing bank can allocate the securities
in the borrowers’ portfolio to lenders willing to finance these securities in
a very efficient way. In addition, the clearing bank can do this on its own
books, thus avoiding the use and costs of a securities transfer and settlement
system.
Lenders in the tri-party repo market typically want to be able to with-
draw their funds on short notice. In particular, money market mutual funds
and securities lending firms keep a substantial portion of their investments in
overnight maturities to enable a quick response to sudden changes in client
behaviors, including redemption requests. This is one reason that a large
fraction of tri-party repo transactions are done on an overnight basis. In-
vesting on an overnight basis can also be a way for the lender to control the
amount of risk it takes. Indeed, the lender can decide not to roll over an
overnight loan to a particular borrower if the risk attached to the borrower
is perceived to increase.
Securities dealers are the main class of borrowers in the tri-party repo
market. They seek to borrow funds to finance the securities they trade. Since
dealers make money by buying and selling securities, it is very important for
them to have the flexibility to easily substitute different types of securities
that are used to collateralize their repos. In the U.S., this flexibility is most
easily achieved in the tri-party repo market.
There are currently two clearing banks in tri-party repo market in the
U.S.: JPMorgan-Chase (JPMC), and Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM).
The clearing banks play a particularly important role for dealers by financing
their securities during the day and allowing them to substitute collateral in
a way that overnight investors may not agree to. As noted above, every af-
ternoon the clearing banks allocates the borrowers’ collateral to the lenders
that are willing to finance it. The next morning, the clearing bank “un-
winds” the previous night’s repos by sending the cash back to the investors
and the securities back to the dealers. Borrowers, however, would like to ob-
tain financing for these securities until the next evening, when the new repo
contracts are finalized. The clearing banks provide this intraday financing.
In addition, the clearing banks allow the dealers to buy and sell the securities
that serve as the collateral for the intraday part of the repo, as long as a suf-
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ficient amount of total collateral is available at all times. As mentioned, the
ability to substitute collateral on an intra-day basis is particularly valuable
to dealers.
The tri-party repo market reached a size of approximately $2.8 trillion in
2008, most of it overnight.4 In this paper, we choose to focus on this mar-
ket because it is an important source of funding for large securities dealers.
Hence, a disruption in that market has severe consequences and could spill
over to the broader financial markets.
While we focus on the case of the tri-party repo market, our theory is more
general. For example, our model would apply to important classes of money
market mutual funds. A popular class of money funds, the so-called 2a7
funds, offer a stable net asset value (NAV). This means that instead of having
a fixed number of shares with a fluctuating price, the price of shares in these
funds is fixed, typically at $1, and the number of shares changes. Since the
number of shares cannot decrease, a fund with a NAV of less than $1 would
have to be liquidated. This is called “breaking the buck”. The stable NAV
feature creates a sequential service constraint that makes these money funds
particularly vulnerable to runs. In September 2008, the Reserve Primary
Fund, which held Lehman commercial paper, broke the buck. This incident
raised concerns about other money funds. During the week of September 15,
investors redeemed about $300 billion from prime money market funds (ICI
2009). These events lead to the creation of a temporary guarantee program
for money funds assets, which was announced on September 19, 2008, and
expired a year later.
3 The Model
3.1 Framework
The economy lasts forever and does not have an initial date. It is pop-
ulated by M infinitely-lived risk-neutral agents called dealers and indexed
by m ∈ {1, ...,M}. Dealers are endowed with a very small amount of con-
sumption goods, which we call cash, and have access to profitable investment
4Task Force on Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure (2009).
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opportunities that we describe below.5 Furthermore, at each date t, a con-
tinuum of mass N of “young” investors is born who live for three dates.
Investors are born with an endowment of 1 unit of goods, that they can in-
vest at date t and have no endowment thereafter. Investors’ preferences for
the timing of consumption are unknown when born at date t. At date t+ 1,
investors learn their type. “Impatient” investors need cash at date t + 1,
while “patient” investors do not need cash until date t+ 2. The information
about the investors’ type and age is private, i.e. cannot be observed by the
market. Ex ante, the probability of being impatient is α. We assume that the
fraction of impatient agents in each generation is also α (the Law of Large
Numbers).
The timing of the investors’ needs of cash is uncertain because of “liquid-
ity” shocks. In practice, repo investors, such as money market mutual funds,
may learn about longer term investment opportunities and wish to redeploy
their cash, or they may need to generate cash to satisfy sudden potential out-
flows from their own investors. We do not model explicitly what investors
do with their cash in the event of a liquidity shock and, for the remainder of
the paper, simply assume that they value them sufficiently highly to want to
withdraw them from the repo market at the given point in time.6 Their util-
ity from getting repayments (r1, r2) over the two-period horizon can therefore
simply be described by
U(r1, r2) =
{
u1(r1) with prob. α
u2(r2) with prob. 1− α
with u1 and u2 strictly increasing.
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5We do not model the clearing banks explicitly in this paper but think of them as being
assimilated with the dealers. Hence, this model abstracts from the potential coordination
problems between the dealers and the clearing banks.
6There are other ways of motivating the short-term nature of repos. Diamond and
Rajan (2000, 2001) argue that short-term liabilities are a way to provide incentives to
bankers who cannot commit to repay the proceeds of their investments to depositors.
A similar argument can be made for dealers. Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008) also
emphasize the role of short-term liabilities to provide incentives.
7We do not assume the traditional consumption-smoothing motive of the Diamond-
Dybvig literature, which would make little sense in our context.
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Everybody in the economy has access to a one-period storage technology,
which we think of as cash and that returns 1 for each unit invested. Dealers
also have access to a long-term technology, which we think of as investment
in, and possibly the creation of, securities. The long-term technology re-
quires managerial expertise and other scarce resources and is therefore costly
and subject to decreasing returns to scale. In terms of costs, a dealer m
who wants to operate the long-term technology in a given period must pay
a fixed operating cost cm ≥ 0 per period. Hence, dealers are potentially het-
erogenous in terms of their cost structure and therefore profitability. This
has important empirical implications, which we explore in Section 7. For
most of the analysis, however, we suppress the subscript m and consider a
representative dealer with cost c.8
We model decreasing returns simply by assuming that there is a limit
beyond which the long-term technology provides no returns. Hence, investing
It units in securities at date t yields{
RIt if It ≤ I
RI if It ≥ I
(1)
with R > 1 at date t+2 and yields nothing at date t+1.9 To simplify things,
we assume that the return on securities is riskless.
The long-term investment returns given by (1) can only be realized by
the dealer who has invested in the asset, because, as we discuss in the next
subsection, dealers have a comparative advantage in managing their security
portfolio. Other market participants only realize a return of γR from these
assets with γ < 1. The exact assumption on γ is given below.
Dealers have cash of their own, but can also use a repo transaction to
borrow the endowment of young investors for investment in securities, which
is the collateral backing the repo. The repo market is imperfectly competitive
8As discussed in the introduction, a more general model could assume that all market
participants have access to the long-term technology and then show that only a small
subset of them would become dealers in order to avoid the duplication of fixed costs. We
simplify the analysis by assuming that only dealers can operate the long-term technology.
9To our knowledge, the need to assume such capacity constraints (or more generally,
decreasing returns) in dynamic models of liquidity provision has first been pointed out by
van Bommel (2006).
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in the sense that dealer entry into the market for borrowing in repo is possible
at a small one-time cost φ > 0. We assume that the total investment capacity
MI strictly exceeds the investors’ amount of cash available for investment in





A model in which this inequality did not hold would be less realistic or
analytically interesting. There would be no competition among dealers for
borrowing cash from investors in the repo market. Dealers could extract all
the surplus from investors by simply offering to repay the storage return of
one each period, and there would be no instabilities or runs. To simplify
notation, we assume from now on that M = N and therefore I > 1.
If a dealer in period t invests It, borrows bt from young investors, promises
a repurchase price (gross interest) r1t for repurchase after one period and r2t
for repurchase after two periods, impatient investors do not roll over their
loans when middle-aged, and patient investors do not roll over their loans
when old, then his expected cash flow at date τ is
πτ = RIτ−2 + bτ − αr1τ−1bτ−1 − (1− α)r2τ−2bτ−2 − Iτ − c (3)
The dealer’s objective at each time t then is to maximize the sum of
discounted expected cash flows
∑∞
τ=t β
τπτ , where β < 1. In order to make
the problem interesting, we assume that dealers are sufficiently patient and
long-term investment is sufficiently profitable:
β2R > 1. (4)
We further assume that dealers cannot borrow over and above their bor-
rowing in the repo market, i.e. that πt ≥ 0 at all times. If dealers could
borrow freely, liquidity shortages and runs would not occur, and an analysis
of the repo market would be pointless.
We can now state our precise assumption on the return of assets that are
transferred to other investors:
βγR < 1 (5)
We do not model the reasons for the discount γ, which in practice can
be numerous. For example, as discussed in the next section, assets used for
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hedging purposes and arbitrage operations can typically only be mobilized
at a loss. γ can also express an uncertainty discount reflecting asymmetric
information between dealers and other market participants. Assumption (5)
is an important element of our theory of illiquidity. It means that dealers
and investors value the existing assets of other dealers strictly less than cash,
and thus implies that investors have an incentive to participate in a run if
one occurs.
3.2 Interpretation
The environment we have described is similar to the dynamic banking model
of Qi (1994), however, the interpretation is different. The standard theory is
of investors who hold deposit contracts with commercial banks, which in turn
hold loans that are typically not marketable, opaque, and not pledgeable. In
our model, we consider securities dealers who finance their securities with
repos. Investors make one-period (overnight) loans to dealers that are col-
lateralized by the securities (the long-term technology). Investors have the
full claim on their individual collateral if the dealer cannot pay the promised
interest rate. To the extent that dealers’ repo transactions are part of a
“shadow banking system,” a banking model seems to provide an adequate
formalization.
Although the securities are marketable and pledgeable, they are less liquid
than cash and give a higher return to dealers than to outside investors. We
interpret this higher return as being generated in several possible ways that
are outside of the model but that correspond with the standard functions of
securities dealers in practice. Each of these functions reduces the liquidity
of the security and requires the expertise and other resources of the dealer.
A dealer can use the security to act as an intermediary to other leveraged
financial firms, to act as a market maker, to hedge other securities, to do
risk management on a broad portfolio, to arbitrage other securities, and to
conduct outright speculation.
As an example, consider the dealer as an intermediary who rehypothecates
an off-the-run Treasury bond and acts as a prime broker to finance a hedge
fund. At date t, the dealer borrows money from the investors and lends the
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money to the hedge fund. The hedge fund buys the off-the-run Treasury
bond, which serves as collateral to the dealer, who then passes it on as
collateral to the investors. The hedge fund can arbitrage the off-the-run
Treasury bond against a separately held on-the-run Treasury bond, provided
the hedge fund can keep the arbitrage on until date t + 2, when the spread
between the Treasuries comes closer into alignment and the hedge fund can
unwind the trade for a profit. A positive return is generated based on the
collateral value of the Treasury bond, the hedge fund’s ability to identify
the arbitrage and predict how long it will take to converge, the liquidity and
price efficiency provided to the Treasury market from the arbitrage, and the
dealer’s value as a financial intermediary. If instead, investors do not roll
over the repo at date t+ 1, then the dealer does not roll over the loan to the
hedge fund. The loans cannot be repaid because the hedge fund would have
to unwind the arbitrage at a loss and default on the dealer, who would have
to default on the investors. Instead, the investors receive the Treasury bond.
The investors have to sell the off-the-run Treasury at date t + 1 at a loss or
hold it until date t + 2, taking on interest rate risk and liquidity risk. The
investors know less than the dealer and the hedge fund about the interest
rate and liquidity risk of the Treasury, do not benefit from collateral value
of the bond, and receives a lower return from the bond than the hedge fund
and dealer would receive.
Next, consider an example of the dealer as a market maker, who profits
by providing liquidity to the market. The investors lend at date t to the
dealer, who buys an illiquid private label mortgage-backed security (MBS)
and uses it as inventory to make a market in the security. The dealer makes
a return of R through his bid-ask spread by buying and selling the MBS over
two periods. However, the dealer needs to have the full two periods to ensure
that he has time to deal in the security to make the bid-ask spread and sell
his inventory at the ask price. If the investors do not roll over the repo,
the dealer cannot repay because he would have to liquidate his position at a
firesale loss. The investors receive the collateral, but cannot extract the full
value from the security as a market maker and instead lose value by selling
the bond in an illiquid market.
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4 Steady-state without runs
As a benchmark, we consider symmetric steady-state allocations in which
in each period young investors lend their cash to dealers and do not roll
over their loan at the time of their liquidity shocks. Hence, in every pe-
riod, each dealer obtains loans from a mass N/M = 1 of young investors,
and repays middle-aged investors who do not roll over their loan and old
investors. We assume that the Law of Large Numbers also holds at the level
of the dealer: each period each dealer gets a representative sample of young
investors. Therefore, each dealer’s realized cash flow is equal to his expected
cash flow (3).
A steady state then is a vector (b, I, r1, r2), where b ≤ 1 is repo borrowing,
I ≤ I investment, r1 repayment for one-period borrowing, and r2 repayment
for two-period borrowing, all per dealer.
Lemma 1: r2 = r
2
1.
Proof: Clearly, r2 ≥ r21, because otherwise investors would strictly prefer
to never roll over their loans, regardless of their type. Patient middle-aged
investors would withdraw their funds and then invest again with young in-
vestors. Suppose that this inequality is strict. In this case, an impatient
middle-aged investor will optimally roll over the loan (and keep his collat-
eral) and at the same time borrow the amount r1+ε on the market at interest
rate r1−1 (note that this loan can be collateralized). He can then claim back
r2 from the dealer one period later and repay his one-period loan (r1 + ε)r1
which is feasible and profitable if ε > 0 is sufficiently small.
The proof is based on a simple no-arbitrage argument. It is different
from the classical argument made by Jacklin (1987) in the context of the
Diamond-Dybvig model, because investors in our context do not have access
to the long-term investment technology. It is also different from the argument
by Qi (1994), who assumes strict concavity of the investors’ utility. In our
market context, the no-arbitrage argument is natural and sufficient.
Hence, we can describe steady states by a triple (b, I, r), where r = r1.
The steady-state budget identity of individual dealers is
RI + b = I + αrb+ (1− α)r2b+ c+ π (6)
13
where the left-hand side are the total inflows per period and the right-hand
side total outflows. Clearly, if R > 1, the higher I the better. We do not
concern ourselves with showing how a steady state with I > 1 could emerge
if there were a startup period. But under our assumption (4) that dealers
are sufficiently patient, it is clear that dealers have an interest in building up
maximum investment from lower investment levels.10
Clearly, (b, I, r) must be such that π ≥ 0, because otherwise dealers would
leave the market. Steady states with no borrowing are uninteresting in our
context. We now characterize the steady states with b > 0 by a sequence of
simple observations.
Lemma 2: If r > 1, steady-state repo borrowing is maximal: b = 1.
Proof: The supply of loanable funds per dealer is inelastically equal to 1 if
r > 1. Hence, the lemma follows from market clearing.
Lemma 3: Steady-state investment is maximal: I = I.
Proof: Suppose the Lemma is wrong. An individual dealer can then increase
investment slightly at any date t by using his own cash. By condition (4),
this yields a strict increase in discounted profits.
Lemma 4: Steady-state repo rates satisfy
(1− α)β2r2 + αβr = 1 (7)
Proof: For each unit of cash that the dealer borrows and invests at date
t, he pays back αr in t + 1, generates returns R in t + 2 and pays back
(1− α)r2 in t+ 2. Hence, his expected discounted profits on this one unit is
β2(R − (1 − α)r2) − βαr. Alternatively he could invest his own cash. The
discounted profits from not borrowing the one unit and rather investing his
10The literature has not always been clear about the distinction between investment
capacity (I in our model) and per capita borrowing (1 in most models). In particular,
the implicit assumption that I = 1 in Qi (1994), Bhattacharya and Padilla (1996) and
Fulghieri and Rovelli (1998) is not necessary, and may even ignore interesting dynamic
features. See van Bommel (2006) for an excellent discussion.
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own money is β2R− 1. In steady state this cannot be strictly better, which
implies (1− α)β2r2 + αβr ≤ 1.
Suppose that this inequality is strict. As argued above, this means that
investment through borrowing is strictly preferred to investing the dealer’s
own cash. But since I > 1 ≥ b, by Lemma 3 in steady state dealers use some
of their own cash to invest. Hence, an individual dealer can increase his
repo rate r slightly, without violating the strict inequality, and thus attract
additional cash from investors. Because the inequality was assumed to be
strict, this makes him strictly better off.
We call condition (7) the dealer’s “repo participation constraint”. Let r
be the solution to (7). Basic algebra shows that r = 1/β > 1. This makes
sense: at the margin, dealers discount profits with the repo market interest
rate. But it is interesting to note that r does not depend on the supply and
demand characteristics R and α. Furthermore, as we shall discuss now and
differently from standard models of financial price competition, dealers make
positive profits at this interest rate, if the fixed costs c are not too high.
From (3), the dealer’s expected steady-state profits with b = 1 and r =
1/β are





To make the analysis interesting we will assume that these profits are
positive, i.e. that R, I, α, or β are sufficiently large or c is sufficiently low.
All of these assumptions are reasonable and consistent with our previous
assumptions.
Assumption: Period costs satisfy





Note that this assumption concerns parameters, not equilibrium values.
An important and novel feature of our model therefore is that condition (7)
prevents competition from driving up repo rates to levels at which dealers
make zero profits. The reason why repo profits are positive is intuitive (but
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not trivial): dealers must have an incentive to use their investment oppor-
tunities on behalf of investors instead of using internal funds to reap those
profits for themselves. This rationale of positive intermediation profits is
different from the traditional banking argument of positive franchise values
(e.g., Bhattacharya, Boot, and Thakor (1998), or Hellmann, Murdock and
Stiglitz, (2000)), as it explicitly recognizes the difference between internal
and external funds.
Proposition 1 Assume that (9) holds. Then the model has exactly one
steady state in which investors roll over repo contracts according to their
liquidity needs. In steady state, b = 1, I = I, r = r, π > 0.
Proof: By Lemmas 2-4, if there is a steady state it is of the form given in the
proposition. Conversely, these choices are optimal for young investors, and,
since r > 1, patient middle-aged investors find it optimal to roll over their
repos.11 By (9), dealers make positive profits and therefore prefer steady-
state borrowing to autarky.
Proposition 1 shows that the model has a unique no-run steady state
and that dealers make strictly positive profits, if periodic fixed costs are
not too high (Assumption (9)). Note that this steady state is robust to
competition from new dealers for any small cost φ > 0 to enter the repo
market. The reason is that there are no gains from repurchase transactions
over and above what can be gained by private investment because the repo
participation constraint binds. Hence, outside banks with access to the long-
term investment technology have no incentive to enter the repo market.
11In typical repo contracts, investors do not have the right to keep the collateral instead
of accepting the repurchase payment. This is what we assume here. Hence, the choice of
an investor is between accepting the repayment and storing it (yielding r next period) or
rolling the contract over (yielding r2 next period). If the investor has the right to refuse
the repayment and keep the security instead, assumption (5) still implies that patient
middle-aged investors find it optimal to roll over their repos.
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5 Repo runs without asset sales
In this section, we study the stability of dealers in the face of possible runs.
We analyze this problem under the assumption that behavior until date t is
as in Proposition 1 and ask whether the beliefs that all investors of a given
dealer will refuse to roll over their loans at date t can be self-fulfilling. The
interaction between dealer and investors at a given date t is as follows. First,
the dealer offers new investors repo contracts specifying that each investor
lends the dealer 1 and gets a newly invested security as collateral that will be
returned to the dealer next period if the investor is repaid r. Simultaneously,
the dealer offers middle-aged investors that they keep their collateral for one
more period and then return it against a repayment of r2. Then, new and
middle-aged investors simultaneously announce whether they lend or roll over
their repo loan, respectively. Finally, if the dealer can satisfy all repayment
demands in cash, she does so and invests the amount It.
If instead the dealer cannot satisfy all withdrawals in cash, then she
defaults. In this case, the young investors get their 1 unit of funds back.
Middle-aged investors who have demanded repayment receive all the cash
available pro-rata, and in addition keep their collateral up to the amount
of their loan. In contrast, investors who had agreed to roll over their loan
simply keep their collateral.
We examine symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of the above
game between investors and the given dealer. The key question is how much
cash the dealer can mobilize to meet the repayment demands by middle-aged
investors. At the beginning of the period, a dealer, on the asset side of his
balance sheet, holds RI units of cash from investments at date t − 2, as
well as securities that will yield RI units of cash at date t + 1. The dealer
holds maturing repos on the liability side of its balance sheet. As derived
in the preceding section, if young investors provide fresh funds, the dealer
has enough cash to repay the loans of (old) patient investors born in t − 2
and (middle-aged) impatient investors born in t − 1 who will not roll over
for sure. Depending on the size of current cash flows and on whether young
investors provide fresh funds, the dealer may not hold enough cash to also
repay patient investors born in t−1 if they choose not to roll over their loans.
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Given the assumption about the treatment of investors in bankruptcy, it
is a weakly dominant strategy for young investors to provide fresh funds.12
We will therefore assume that young investors indeed always provide fresh
funds. Then, the run demand can be satisfied by the individual dealer if
π ≥ (1− α)r, which is equivalent to
(R− 1)I ≥ r + (1− α)r2 − 1− c (10)
But more is possible. In the event of a run at date t, the cash position of
the individual dealer who satisfies the run demand is
I0 = RI + 1− r − (1− α)r2 − c (11)
Clearly, if I0 < 0 the dealer does not have the liquidity to stave off the
run, and the dealer is bankrupt. However, if I0 ≥ 0, but (10) does not hold,
the dealer can invest less than the steady state level I in order to liberate
cash to accommodate the run demand. This yields a lower return in t + 2,
but it is still consistent with continuing borrowing the full amount of 1 from
investors and making the full steady state repayments in the future, because
the dealer can make payments out of his date t + 2 profits to cover the
shortfall resulting from (a limited degree of) underinvestment. In the limit,
the dealer can exhaust all of his profits at date t+2 and reduce investment in
t correspondingly by π/R. In fact, he can carry this further. At date t+2 he
can reduce investment below the steady state level to liberate cash that can
be used to meet the shortfall resulting from a further reduction in investment
at date t, etc. This way, the dealer can reduce investment in future periods
t + 2k, k = 1, 2, ..., in order to shift profits forward to date t, which allows
him to liberate more and more of the current cash to accommodate the run
demand.
Lemma 5: In response to a run, the optimal sequence of investments at
dates t + 2k, k = 0, 1, 2, ..., reduces profits to zero up to a certain period
12Other assumptions about the treatment of investors in bankruptcy yield even tighter
constraints for dealer solvency and liquidity, because then young investors may not provide
liquidity in case of a run.
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(which can be ∞), from which on investment is back to the steady state level
I.
Proof: Suppose that there is a period t+ 2k0 in which investment is smaller
than I and the dealer makes positive profits. Then the dealer can reduce
profits in t+2k0 slightly by investing δ > 0 more, which yields Rδ in t+2k0+2.
From then on he sticks to the former investment sequence. By (4), he is
strictly better off. To complete the proof note that if there is a period in
which the dealer can invest I, then he can do so ever after and this is optimal.
The policy identified in Lemma 5 is a value reducing distortion of invest-
ment. But since it allows the dealer to generate current cash and keep the
business alive, it is preferred to going bankrupt. The amount of cash the











But in fact, more is possible. The above investment strategy does not
involve the dealer’s behavior at dates t+ 2k + 1, k = 0, 1, 2, .... If the dealer
sets an amount S aside out of date t + 1 - profits and stores it until t + 2,
then he can reduce investment in t by S/R, by using S in t + 2 to cover
the shortfall. By the same logic as above, the dealer can now increase the
amount set aside in t+ 1 by reducing investment in t+ 1 and making up for
the shortfall in t + 3 by using profits from t + 3, etc. As in Lemma 5, it is
straightforward to show that the optimal strategy in periods t+2k+1 features
maximum investment for as long as possible. By following this strategy, the
dealer can again bring all future profits π from periods t + 2k + 1 forward.
Moreover, after a run, in period t+ 1 there is more cash than just π because
the amount (1 − α)r2 is no longer due, having been withdrawn already in
the run. Hence, the total amount of cash that can be freed up at date t by
bringing profits from periods t+ 2k + 1 forward is
1
R
(π + (1− α)r2) + 1
R2
π + ... =
1
R
(1− α)r2 + 1
R− 1
π (13)
(12) and (13) together yield the total amount of cash that the dealer can
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(1− α)r2 + R + 1
R− 1
(
(R− 1)I + 1− αr − (1− α)r2 − c
)
where we have inserted π from (8). Whether or not the dealer can indeed
pay out F0 depends on his liquidity, max(0, I0). Hence, the actual amount
of cash the dealer can liberate in response to the run is min(max(0, I0), F0).
The dealer can therefore avert the run if the following liquidity and solvency
constraints are both satisfied:
I0 ≥ 0 (14)
F0 ≥ (1− α)r (15)
Condition (14) requires that the dealer has the cash needed to satisfy
the additional liquidity demand in the run. Condition (15) makes sure that
the dealer can mobilize enough future returns by adjusting his investment
behavior. The former constraint refers to the dealer’s (current) liquidity, the
latter to his overall solvency.
Using the steady-state value r = 1/β in the above two conditions and
re-arranging, we get the following result, where we re-introduce the explicit
reference to the dealer in question.
Proposition 2 In steady state, a run on dealer m is impossible if the dealer’s
liquidity and solvency constraints hold, i.e. if
β2RI ≥ 1− α + β − (1− cm)β2 (16)











If any of these two conditions is violated and the dealer cannot sell his
assets, then a run cannot be prevented if it occurs and the run bankrupts the
dealer.
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Proof: Suppose conditions (16) and (17) hold and all patient middle-aged
investors demand repayment. Since the young investors provide fresh funds,
the preceding argument has shown that the dealer can satisfy the run de-
mand. Middle-aged patient investors therefore receive r, which they can
store until t+ 1. If such an investor does not run, he receives r2 in t+ 1. He
therefore strictly prefers not to run.
If any of the two conditions (16) or (17) is violated, the dealer cannot
satisfy the run demand. Each middle-aged patient investor therefore receives
a payment in cash of ωr, where ω ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of the return due,
plus some of his collateral. If γR < r(1 − ω) he keeps all of his collateral
and thus has a total payoff of ωr + γR in t + 1. If γR ≥ r(1 − ω) he keeps
the fraction r(1− ω)/γR of the collateral and thus has a total payoff of r in
t + 1. If, alternatively, he does not run he gets his collateral value γR. By
(5) he strictly prefers to run in both cases.
Note that either of the conditions in Proposition 2 may be binding. In
fact, (16) binds for α = 0 and β not too small, while (17) binds for α = 1.
Furthermore, the higher the period costs cm, the tighter are both constraints.
This is intuitive, because higher c mean lower profits, hence smaller buffers
against the run. Note that even in the extreme case in which dealer activ-
ity is costless (cm = 0) (16) and (17) may not hold. In the relevant case
of intermediate costs, the inequalities can go both ways. If cm approaches
the bound in (9) the inequalities are obviously reversed, because per period
profits become so small that neither current nor future profits are enough to
stave off the run.
Proposition 2 shows that if dealers have sufficient access to profitable in-
vestment (I sufficiently large) or if these investment opportunities are suffi-
ciently profitable (R sufficiently large), dealers can stave off runs individually,
only by reducing their investment temporarily and shifting profits forward in
time. In this case, runs cannot occur, even out of steady state. If one of the
two conditions in Proposition 2 is violated, i.e. if the dealer is expected to
be illiquid or insolvent in case of a run, a run would bankrupt the individual
dealer if the dealer cannot sell his illiquid assets. A run would therefore be
a self-fulfilling prophecy and can upset the steady state.
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6 Runs and Asset Sales
In this section, we introduce the possibility of asset sales as a reaction to a
run. As in the last section, we first consider a situation where the investors
of only one dealer may run. In the next section, we consider the case where
there is a potential run on the whole market. We ask the same question as
in the last section: if behavior until date t is steady state as in Proposition
1, can the beliefs that all investors of a given dealer will refuse to roll over
their loans at date t be self-fulfilling?
At date t, the dealer, indexed by, say, m, holds assets that will yield RĪ
at date t+ 1, but nothing at date t. We assume that in response to the run,
the dealer can sell his illiquid assets to other dealers at some market price
p. The price other dealers are ready to pay will depend on the value they
can realize from these assets in the future and on their own cash available
for asset purchases.
If the dealer under distress sells an amount A of assets, this improves
his current liquidity by pA and worsens his solvency through a reduction of
(t+ 1)-cash by RA. Since p ≤ βR, this immediately implies that asset sales
are of no help if the dealer’s solvency condition is violated:
Lemma 6: If the dealer’s solvency condition (17) does not hold, then asset
sales cannot stave off a run.
If, on the other hand, the solvency condition is slack, then the dealer
can use asset sales in order to improve his current liquidity. If his liquidity
constraint (16) holds as well, then a run does not occur, as seen in the last
section. Off the equilibrium path, the dealer then can trade off the costs
and benefits of selling assets against the losses from bringing forward future
profits without trading. If his liquidity constraint is violated, he is forced to
sell assets.
Remember from (11) in the last section that his liquidity constraint is
violated if I0 < 0. To facilitate notation denote the dealer’s net steady state
repayments to investors (including fixed costs) by
nm = αr + (1− α)r2 − 1 + cm (18)
22
From now on, we suppress the index m for ease of notation. If the investor
sells A of his current long-term assets, satisfies the run demand, saves the
amount S of cash at date t+ 1 to date t+ 2 in order to reduce investment in
t by S/R, and forgoes profits during the first T periods from date t on until
the investment level reaches I (T ≤ ∞), then the sequence of investments,
starting at date t, is
I0 = RI + 1 + pA− r − (1− α)r2 − c = RI + pA− n− (1− α)r (19)
I1 = R(I − A) + 1− αr − S − c = R(I − A)− n+ (1− α)r2 − S(20)
I2 = RI0 + 1 + S − αr − (1− α)r2 − c = RI0 − n+ S (21)
I3 = RI1 + 1− αr − (1− α)r2 − c = RI1 − n (22)
I4 = RI2 + 1− αr − (1− α)r2 − c = RI2 − n (23)
etc. (24)
































for k ≥ 1. Each of these two recursions comes to an end when In ≥ I.
Equations (25) and (27) directly imply
Lemma 7: The sequences I2k and I2k+1 satisfy

















Because profits cannot be negative, the proposed investment strategy is
infeasible if (29) or (31) hold. Conversely, if and only if (28) and (30) hold
with weak inequality, S ≥ 0, and the initial feasibility constraints I0 ≥ 0 and
I1 ≥ 0 hold, then the proposed strategy is feasible. Note that (30) implies
I1 ≥ 0. Using (19) and (20), we can express (28) and (30), as well the
remaining feasibility constraint, in terms of the steady-state investment level
I:
I0 ≥ 0⇔ RI ≥ n+ (1− α)r − pA (32)
I2k ↗ ⇔ RI ≥
R
R− 1
n+ (1− α)r − pA− 1
R
S (33)
I2k+1 ↗ ⇔ RI ≥
R
R− 1
n− (1− α)r2 + S +RA (34)






r2 − A ≥ −RI + R
R− 1
n+ (1− α)r − pA





(1− p)A+ (1− α)r(R− r)
R + 1
⇔ (p− 1)A ≥ R + 1
R− 1
n+ (1− α)r(R− r)
R
− (R + 1)I (35)
Conversely, if (35) holds, then it is possible to find an S such that (33)
and (34) hold. Yet, it is also necessary that S ≥ 0. From (34), this can be
achieved if and only if:






If (36) is violated, then the dealer’s asset position at date t+1 is so small
that he will eventually become insolvent (I2k+1 will become negative).
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Hence, (32), (36), and (35) are necessary and sufficient for asset sales to
be able to prevent a run. We now re-introduce the reference to cm in order
to make the dependence of these conditions on the dealer’s cost structure
explicit. The argument above implies that whether or not a run can be
prevented depends on the dealer’s costs and the market value of his assets in
case of a fire sale:
13Note that the right-hand side of (36) is strictly positive by (9).
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Proposition 3 A run on dealer m cannot succeed iff the solvency constraint
(17) holds and the market price of the dealer’s long-term assets satisfies
p ≥ p (37)
where p = R(R− 1) 1− α + β − β
2(1− cm)− β2RI
β2R(R− 1)I + β2R(1− cm)− αβR− 1 + α
< 1
Otherwise a run cannot be prevented if it occurs and bankrupts the dealer.
Proof: If the solvency constraint does not hold, a run is successful if it occurs
by Lemma 6. So assume that the solvency constraint holds.









≥ n+ (1− α)r −RI (38)
The left-hand side of (38) is strictly positive by (9). If the liquidity
constraint (16) holds, the right-hand side of (38) is not positive (hence, (38)
holds trivially) and runs can be staved off by Proposition 2. Suppose the
liquidity constraint does not hold. Then dividing through by the round
bracket on the left hand side and inserting r = 1/β yields (37). The solvency
constraint implies that p < 1.
The right-hand side of (35) is negative because the solvency constraint
holds. Therefore, (35) and (32) are trivially compatible if p ≥ 1. It also
can be easily verified that the two are compatible if p = p. Hence they are
compatible for all p ≥ p.
On the demand side for assets, the cash available to buy up the distressed
dealer’s assets is given by a similar consideration as in the previous section.
Each of the M − 1 healthy dealers has πi in terms of current profits and can
bring forward profits of πi of each future period by adjusting his investment
policy. As argued above, the total sum of profits that an individual dealer
can potentially mobilize in period t therefore is





πi = πi +
2
R− 1





Furthermore, the buyers of the distressed assets receive γR per unit of
the asset in t + 1 (where 0 ≤ γ < 1), which they can store until t + 2, and
thus further reduce investment in t by γR/R. At date t, each of the M − 1
healthy dealers has
Ii = RI + 1− αr − (1− α)r2 − ci
in cash, after having received funds from new investors and repaid maturing
repos to existing investors, but before investing in new long-term assets.14
If individual healthy dealers each purchase Ai of the distressed assets
(
∑M−1
i=1 Ai = A), each must invest at least I − (fi + γAi) in new long-term
assets. Hence, his cash available at date t is
Ii −
(
I − (fi + γAi)
)
= Fi + γAi






πi + γA. (39)
We can now characterize the demand for assets by healthy dealers. It
is straightforward to see that he highest price healthy dealers will pay for
securities is the price at which the discounted return of the securities is equal
to the opportunity cost of the cash needed to purchase the securities.
Lemma 8: If p > βγR, healthy dealers do not buy any of the distressed





and is decreasing in p.
While a full characterization of the demand for assets is of little interest,
an important special case deserves special attention:
Proposition 4 If the solvency constraint of dealer m is violated or if his
liquidity constraint is violated and βγR < p, then a run on dealer m cannot
be staved off and bankrupts the dealer if it occurs.
14Note that Ii = πi + I > 0.
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The proof follows directly from Proposition 3. As seen in the proposition,
if the dealer’s solvency constraint is violated, asset sales cannot help to raise
the cash necessary to stave off the run if it occurs. If the solvency constraint
holds, but the liquidity constraint is violated, then (37) shows that the dis-
tressed dealer can only survive if he can sell his assets at a price of at least
p. However, Lemma 8 shows that for any such price, the demand for these
assets is zero. Hence, the market for distressed assets cannot operate, and
the run, if it occurs, bankrupts the dealer.
7 Market Runs
As noted above, the more dealers are in trouble, the more assets troubled
dealers are trying to sell and the fewer dealers are available to buy these
assets. This puts pressure on the price of assets and it makes it less likely
that a run can be avoided. In the extreme case of a market run, no dealer
is available to buy assets, and dealers are in the same situation as if their
assets were not marketable. Hence, the conditions of Proposition 2 are the
relevant ones in order to evaluate the possibility of runs.
As Proposition 2 shows, the possibility of a run against dealer m depends
on his costs cm. We therefore get the following classification of dealers in the
case of a market run.
Proposition 5 There is a critical threshold c ≥ 0 such that in the case of
a market run all dealers with cm ≤ c are able to stave off the run and all
dealers with cm > c are bankrupted.
The critical threshold c is the largest value cm such that conditions (16)
and (17) in Proposition 2 both hold. While our theory is a theory of multiple
equilibria and therefore cannot predict runs, Proposition 5 makes a precise
prediction about the outcome of a market run if one is attempted: The
weakest firms in terms of their cost structure must fail, while the stronger
ones cannot fail.
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8 Extension: Liquidity provision
Access to a lender of last resort is a standard tool used to strengthen the
banking sector in the face of financial fragility. Theoretical work has shown
how access to a lender of last resort can prevent bank runs (see, for example,
Allen and Gale 1998, Martin 2006, Skeie 2004). In the U.S., the broker dealers
that rely on the tri-party repo market as a source of short-term funding did
not have direct access to discount window. This lack of access to emergency
liquidity proved destabilizing during the crisis and motivated the Federal
Reserve to introduce the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF). Similar
concerns about money market mutual funds, who represent an important
share of investors in the tri-party repo market, motivated the creation of
the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity
Facility (AMLF), and the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF).
These facilities were created under section 13.3 of the Federal Reserve Act,
which allows the Federal Reserve to lend to a variety of institutions under
unusual and exigent circumstances. As such, these facilities are temporary.15
The Task Force on Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure (2009) notes the need
to “Consider establishing an industry-sponsored utility with the ability to
finance the securities portfolio of a faltering or defaulted dealer and limit
the associated stress on the market while their portfolio is liquidated.” The
model in our paper suggests that there would be benefits to the creation of
a lender-of-last-resort facility for the tri-party repo market. The argument
is similar to the case of banking. In case of a run, investors do not refuse to
roll over their loans because they need cash, but because they are concerned
about the default of the dealer and having to hold collateral that they might
have to liquidate. As in Allen and Gale (1998), Martin (2006), or Skeie
(2004), a lender of last resort could lend cash to the dealer taking securities
as collateral. The cash could be used to pay all investors who do not roll
over their loans. This would prevent the default of the dealer and allow it
to manage the collateral until it matures. Knowing that the dealer will not
default, investors no longer have to worry about having to hold or liquidate
15The MMIFF expired on October 30, 2009. The Board of Governors approved extension
of the AMLF and the PDCF through February 1, 2010.
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assets, so their incentive to run is reduced.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we study a model of short-term collateralized borrowing and
the conditions under which runs can occur. Our framework resembles the
dynamic model of banks studied in Qi (1994), but expands that model in
a number of directions. We derive a dynamic participation constraint that
must hold for dealers to agree to purchase securities on behalf of investors.
Under this constraint, dealers will make profits that can be mobilized to
forestall runs.
A key difference between traditional banks and modern financial interme-
diaries is that the former mainly hold opaque assets while the latter’s assets
are much more liquid and marketable. We study the role of market able as-
sets in preventing bank runs. Without asset sales, runs can be forestalled by
mobilizing current and future assets. This gives rise to two constraints that
can be interpreted as a solvency and a liquidity constraint. The solvency
constraint assures that there are enough current and future profits to repay
all investors who do not renew their loans. The liquidity constraint guaran-
tees that the necessary resources are available at the date the run occurs. A
run can be prevented if neither constraints are violated.
Next we consider the case where dealers can sell their assets. We show
that because of cash-in-the-market pricing, the price of assets will depend on
the number of dealers trying to sell assets and the opportunity cost of funds
for dealers willing to buy assets. As more dealers try to sell their assets, the
price of the assets they sell will decline.
Asset sales can help a solvent but illiquid dealer stave of a run, as they
provide an alternative way of mobilizing future profits. However, we show
that the price of the assets cannot be so high that the solvency constraint is
relaxed. If the liquidity constraint binds, but the solvency constraint is slack,
dealers can relax the liquidity constraint even if the price of assets is low. In
the limit, however, as all dealers are affected by a run, no dealer is available
to purchase assets. In this extreme case, asset sales cannot help dealers.
Our framework can be used to consider interesting policy questions re-
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lated to the fragility of the tri-party repo funding mechanism. For example,
Lehman’s demise highlighted an important problem: There is no framework
to unwind the positions of any large bank that deals in repo should it fail.
Lehman required large loans from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to
settle its repo transactions (WSJ 2009). Our framework can be used to study
a liquidation agent, as suggested in the Task Force on Tri-Party Repo Infras-
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